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THE FAILURE OF LOCAL AND FEDERAL
PROSECUTORS TO CURB
POLICE BRUTALITY
Asit S. Panwala*
INTRODUCTION
Excessive use of force by police officers undermines faith in the
criminal justice system. Citizens expect those with badges and guns
to follow the law as well as enforce it, but these two roles often
come into conflict. Reporter Craig Horowitz recounted that one
police officer justified his hitting a suspect in the stomach when the
suspect tried to run away as being necessary to reestablish author-
ity.1 Another police officer is quoted as saying, "[i]f someone
disses you, you take him in an alley and slap him. If it's known in
the street you can be stepped on, you've got a problem."'2
Police brutality is usually defined as any excessive use of force by
a police officer under color of law.3 Police chiefs from ten major
cities have agreed that the "problem of excessive force in Ameri-
can policing is real," rather than a rare occurrence.4 Not only does
police brutality perpetuate the notion that street justice is accept-
able, but also victims are unlikely to develop respect for the law
when officers abuse their lawful authority. Instead, justice requires
that police officers refrain from acting like street thugs, even if they
are "dissed."
Although police departments across the country have attempted
to ameliorate the hostility between police officers and the commu-
nity, through careful screening of applicants, minority recruitment,
* Assistant District Attorney, Felony Cases, Bronx County District Attorney's
Office. B.A., University of California Berkeley, 1996; J.D., New York University,
1999. The Author would like to thank Christine Chen, Anthony Thompson, and Ron-
ald Goldstock for their support and help in this endeavor.
1. Craig Horowitz, Show of Force, N.Y. MAG., Sept. 22, 1997, at 29-30.
2. Id. at 31.
3. See Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The Circumvention of Just
Sentencing For Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 686 (1996) (arguing that the
concept of police brutality should be expanded to include physical, psychological, and
legal abuse. Psychological abuse occurs when an officer threatens physical harm or an
unjustified arrest. Legal abuse may occur even without physical or psychological
abuse; it is the violation of a person's constitutional rights.).
4. Paul Hoffman, The Feds, Lies, and Videotape: The Need For An Effective Fed-
eral Role in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1458
(1993) (citations omitted).
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and community policing, police brutality remains a problem within
our urban cities. Often the victims of police brutality are minori-
ties stereotyped by the public as criminals in order to justify the
reaction of white police officers.5 As a result, police brutality deep-
ens the racial divide in this country, and sparks riots within major
cities.6 If we revere the principle of equal protection for all, then
police officers cannot stand above the law, especially when the ra-
cial dynamics of police brutality are considered.7
The criminal, a marginalized member of society, is in many ways
the perfect victim for police brutality because of her so-called "lack
of innocence." The law, however, is meant to protect every indi-
vidual. If prosecutors are to uphold their roles as ministers of jus-
tice, they must investigate and prosecute all police officers accused
of wrongdoing. Policing the police is essential to building public
trust in government and legitimating the rules of our society. Oth-
erwise, communities, especially those of color, become fearful of
the police and understandably fail to cooperate in stopping crime.8
Besides hindering law enforcement, police brutality may also
lead to police corruption. The Mollen Commission, for example,
found that "[o]nce the line was crossed without consequences, it
was easier [for officers] to abuse their authority in other ways, in-
cluding corruption."9
Currently, there are no guidelines for determining when local or
state prosecutors should take police brutality cases and when the
federal government should handle them. Often cases are accepted
on an ad hoc basis. In the Abner Louima case, Brooklyn District
Attorney Charles Hynes and United States Attorney for the East-
ern District of New York Zachary Carter, agreed that they would
5. See Freeman, supra note 3, at 706-07.
6. For example, all of the following riots followed a police shooting or beating:
Harlem in 1964, Newark in 1967, Atlanta in 1970, Miami in 1980, Los Angeles in 1992,
and Cincinnati in 2001. Id. at 707-08.
7. See Robin D. Barnes, Blue by Day and White by (K)night: Regulating the Polit-
ical Affiliations of Law Enforcement and Military Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1079,
1092-94, 1115-17 (1996) (discussing how the power entrusted to public safety officials
provides white supremacists with unparalleled opportunities to conduct race warfare
through police brutality, and how the harms of police brutality affect the equality of
opportunity for African-Americans).
8. See Freeman, supra note 3, at 709.
9. Rob Yale, Searching for the Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1841, 1845 (1997) (citing THE CITY OF N.Y. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGA-
TIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION & THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE PO-
LICE DEPARTMENT, COMMISSION REPORT: ANATOMY OF FAILURE: A PATH FOR
SUCCESS 47 (1994)).
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"sit down and decide where the case will best be prosecuted"1 af-
ter the federal grand jury had completed its investigation. Ulti-
mately, federal prosecutors handled the case, conducted three
separate trials, and successfully obtained convictions against two
police officers.11 This Essay will suggest that federal prosecutors
will be more successful in deterring police violence if they devote
their resources to pattern-of-practice lawsuits against police de-
partments, instead of handling individual cases.
This Essay will first argue that police brutality is largely ignored.
Second, it will examine the obstacles facing local and federal prose-
cutors in obtaining convictions. Then it will compare the advan-
tages and disadvantages of delegating primary responsibility for
these cases to the state versus the federal level. Finally, it will ar-
gue that, although there are obstacles and advantages for both lo-
cal and federal prosecutors, ultimately justice is best served when
police brutality is primarily pursued by local prosecutors.
I. POLICE BRUTALITY Is LARGELY IGNORED
Abusive police officers are under-prosecuted by state prosecu-
tors. For example, the 1992 Kolts Report criticized the Los Ange-
les District Attorney's office for prosecuting only one deputy from
the Los Angeles Sheriff Department ("LASD") out of the 382 re-
ferrals they had received in the preceding ten years.12 The Kolts
investigation also uncovered several cases that deserved prosecu-
10. Joseph P. Fried, Prosecutors Building a Case for a Federal Louima Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 1998, at B4. On August 9, 1997, New York City Police Officers took
Abner Louima to the 70th Police Precinct, and sodomized him with a broken wooden
broom. Id.
11. Federal prosecutors spent considerable resources over the course of five years
in prosecuting Police Officers Justin Volpe, Thomas Wiese, Thomas Bruder, and
Charles Schwarz for sodomizing Abner Louima. Prosecutors obtained convictions
against all four officers, but Wiese, Bruder, and Schwarz's convictions were over-
turned by the Second Circuit in February 2002. William Glaberson, Guilty Verdict in
Perjury Count in Louima Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at Al. Federal prosecutors
retried Charles Schwarz and the jury deadlocked on two counts, but found him guilty
of one count of perjury. Id. On the verge of a fourth trial, Schwarz agreed to serve a
five-year prison term with credit for time previously served on the overturned convic-
tion, with a promise not to claim his innocence publicly in exchange for not having to
admit acting as an accomplice to Justin Volpe. William Glaberson, Case Closed, Not
Resolved, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Glaberson, Case Closed, Not
Resolved]. Federal prosecutors chose not to retry Thomas Wiese and Thomas Bruder.
William Glaberson, Two Officer in Louima Case Will Not Face Charges Again, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2002, at B1.
12. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1479-80 (citing JAMES G. KOLTS ET AL., REPORT OF
Los ANGELES SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT 146 (1992) [hereinafter KOLTS REPORT]).
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tion, but were not pursued.1 3 One such case involved a shooting
incident where both witnesses and the coroner contradicted the of-
ficer's testimony by stating that the victim had been shot in the side
and back, and not in the front. 4 Eighty-seven percent of the civil-
ians shot under questionable circumstances by LASD deputies
were African-American, Latino, Asian, or Pacific Islander. 15
There is an argument to be made that, given the history of state
indifference to crimes against minorities, federal prosecutors
should handle these cases.' 6 For example, the failure of southern
state authorities to curb official lawlessness against African-Ameri-
cans that provided the motivation for a federal remedy for civil
rights in the first place.' 7
Although federal prosecutors have jurisdiction to handle these
cases, however, it is not evident that they will exercise it. For ex-
ample, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") investigated
720 criminal civil rights complaints between 1982 and 1991 in the
Central District of California, which includes Los Angeles."8 Ap-
proximately 258 officers who were investigated worked for the Los
Angeles Police Department or the Los Angeles Sheriff's Depart-
ment.' 9 Out of the 258 officers investigated, federal prosecutors
indicted only four officers.20 Between 1984 and 1990, the FBI in-
vestigated approximately 3,000 complaints of criminal civil rights
abuse a year, but federal prosecutors presented only about fifty
cases, a little under two percent, to a grand jury in each of those
years.2' In the three years preceding the Rodney King incident,
there were only ninety-eight federal prosecutions of police brutal-
ity in the entire nation.22 It appears that FBI agents in Los Angeles
generally dismissed complaints on the basis of police reports which
13. KOLTS REPORT, supra note 12, at 146.
14. Id.
15. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1479 (citing David Parrish & Beth Barrett, The
Sheriffs Shootings: Minorities Are a Majority, L.A. DAILY NEws, Oct. 7, 1990, at 12).
16. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 3, at 718.
17. Id.
18. H.R. REP. No. 102-242(l), at 402 (1991).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1532 n.159.
22. David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained?, 27 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 499 n.134 (1992) (citing Police Brutality: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Police Brutality Hearings] (statements of
John Dunne, Assistant United States Attorney General).
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are often misleading or self-serving.23 The failure to thoroughly in-
vestigate these complaints by interviewing witnesses and examining
relevant documents demonstrates that federal authorities have not
taken police brutality seriously, thereby creating an environment
where police violence is tolerated.
II. OBSTACLES FACING LOCAL AND FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
A. Double Jeopardy Concerns
The federal government ordinarily defers to local authorities in
the prosecution of police brutality.24 In Abbate v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy provision of the
United States Constitution is not violated when both state and fed-
eral authorities prosecute a defendant for her actions.25 In jurisdic-
tions such as New York, however, the state constitution forbids the
state prosecution of defendants who have already been tried in the
federal system.26 Thus if the goal is to obtain a conviction, even at
the cost of two trials, federal prosecutors in such jurisdictions must
wait for the state court verdict before initiating their prosecution.27
Nevertheless, federal prosecutors pursued charges against the po-
lice officers accused of torturing Abner Louima rather than wait
for a verdict in state court.28
B. Statutory Burdens of Proof and the Difficulty
in Obtaining Convictions
When a district attorney prosecutes police officers for brutality,
the defendants are usually charged with assault or murder.29 Ad-
mittedly, it is difficult to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
arresting officer intended to use excessive force. State prosecutors,
however, may also charge police officers with criminal negligence
23. KOLTS REPORT, supra note 12, at 113-19; Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1532 n.172
(citing INDEP. COMM'N. ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT
COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 168-71 (1991) [hereinafter
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION]).
24. The Justice Department has a "petite policy," whereby "federal prosecution of
civil rights crimes is deferred until after state investigation and prosecution." Id. at
1532 n.158 (citing 9 U.S. ATrORNEYS MANUAL 21-25 (1985)).
25. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194-96 (1959).
26. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; see People v. LoCicero, 200 N.E.2d 622, 622-24 (N.Y.
1964) (holding that the New York Constitution forbids state prosecution for an of-
fense prosecuted under federal law).
27. Nothing prevents the federal prosecutor from prosecuting a defendant, who is
found guilty under state law, for the corresponding federal offense.
28. Fried, supra note 10, at B4.
29. Freeman, supra note 3, at 686.
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for firing their guns and causing injury or death.30 These charges
only require the prosecutor to show that a reasonable officer would
not have feared for her safety and fired her weapon.31 Jurors often
struggle with whether the officer's actions were reasonable because
the police officer is frequently the only witness as to how much
resistance she encountered.32 Furthermore, the victim was usually
committing a crime at the time of the abuse.33 Thus, police officers
have the "advantage of inherent credibility with juries simply by
virtue of their position."34 Juries sometimes nullify cases because
they view police officers as the "thin blue line" between order and
anarchy. 35 William Bermeister, head of the New York County Dis-
trict Attorney's Official-Corruption Unit from 1992-2000, stated
that these cases are difficult to prosecute because "jurors give of-
ficers the benefit of a doubt," and because "if you don't have an
'innocent' victim, jurors don't care. '36 His unit's conviction rate at
trial in 1998 was a mere twenty-five percent, far below New York
County's general conviction rate of approximately seventy-five
percent. 37 His unit, however, lost only two trials in its first seven
years.38
30. See Frank G. Zarb, Jr., Note, Police Liaibility for Creating the Need to Use
Deadly Force in Self Defense, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1982, 1984-85 (1988); see also Bill Lan
Lee, The Nexus Between Race and Policy: Interview with Bill Lan Lee, Acting Assis-
tant Attorney General for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Justice, 4 GEo. PuB. POL'Y
REV. 119, 120-21 (1999).
31. See Zarb, supra note 30, at 1984-85; see also Lan Lee, supra note 30, at 120-21.
32. Freeman, supra note 3, at 723-24.
33. See id. at 724-25.
34. Id. at 725 (citing Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 22, at 120 (testimony of
James Fyfe, Professor of Criminal Justice, American University)); see Gabriel J. Chin
& Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A
New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Prr. L. REV. 233, 289-91 (1998) (discussing
jury instructions that may remedy misplaced confidence in police officer testimony).
35. The "thin blue line" represents the belief that the police are the last line of
defense in a struggle against an unruly and dangerous underclass that is becoming
more criminal. See Patrick J. Buchanan, The Police are the Last Line of Defense, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at M5; Llewellyn H. Rockwell, It's Safe Streets Versus Urban
Terror; In the '50s, Rampant Crime Didn't Exist Because Offenders Feared What the
Police Would Do, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1991, at M5.
36. Interview with William Burmeister, Chief, New York County's District Attor-
ney's Official-Corruption Unit, in New York, N.Y. (May 3, 1999).
37. Id. Note the these statistics cannot be readily compared with the statistics
from the Department of Justice because they do not include convictions by pleas,
which would raise the average.
38. Id. Note that Lawrence Stephens, Head of the New York County District At-
torney's Official-Corruption Unit from 1990-1992, attributes the early success of the
Official-Corruption Unit to its selectivity in pursuing cases. He stated that his unit did
not prosecute cases where there may have been an impulsive punch. Interview with
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Bermeister claims that these cases are more difficult to prosecute
under state law than under federal law because of grand jury im-
munity.39 Under New York law, a person subpoenaed to a grand
jury receives "transactional immunity," unless she waives it.4° In
the federal system, one receives only "use immunity."' 41 Under
transactional immunity, a witness who testifies to the grand jury
and discusses her role in committing the crime cannot be prose-
cuted.42 Under use immunity, the prosecutor may prosecute the
witness, but may not use the compelled testimony or information
derived from the compelled testimony against the witness.43 If the
prosecutor is able to obtain information from independent source,
she may prosecute the witness.44
To make matters more difficult for New York City prosecutors,
they are not allowed to question police officers who are the subject
of an investigation until forty-eight hours after the incident,
thereby giving the officers the opportunity to confer with each
other and with their attorneys.45 Although the police department
may require an officer to answer questions or face suspension, the
department must provide use immunity through what is known as a
"G.O.-15" or General Order 15.46 The immunity regime in New
York forces the prosecutor's hand because she must often decide
whether to subpoena an officer who was at the scene based on very
little information. The prosecutor must weigh her ability to obtain
an indictment at the cost of discovering that the subpoenaed police
officer assisted in committing the crime. The immunity regime
places local prosecutors at a disadvantage to the extent that guilty
officers would rather admit the truth and obtain immunity, than
develop cover stories and lie for their colleagues.
Lawrence Stephens, Justice, Criminal Court for Bronx County, in New York, N.Y.
(Apr. 19, 2001).
39. Interview with William Burmeister, supra note 36.
40. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.40 (McKinney 2002). Transaction immunity is
the broadest immunity available.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1998); see Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972)
(holding that transactional immunity is not required by the Constitution).
42. N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW § 19.40 cmt. (McKinney 1993).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2003).
44. United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 39 n.21 (2000) (quoting Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 564 (1892)).
45. Barry C. Scheck, Criminal Prosecution and Section 1983, 16 TouRo L. REV.
895, 906-907 (2000).
46. Id. at 913 & n.109 (citing Dan Barry, Officers Silence Still Thwarting Torture
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 1997, at Al).
645
646 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
Under federal law, the prosecutor cannot argue that an officer
acted recklessly or with criminal negligence. 47 Instead, the defen-
dant would be charged with violating the civil rights of the victim
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.48 In Screws v. United States,
the Supreme Court held that a conviction under § 242 required
proof that the defendant specifically intended to deprive the victim
of a constitutional right.49 Later, in United States v. Guest, the
Court read the same requirement into § 241, which prohibits con-
spiring to violate the civil rights of another.5" Thus, under federal
law, the prosecutor must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
officer used excessive force and that she intended to do so.51 The
intent requirement is an additional evidentiary burden that the fed-
eral prosecutor must meet, whereas local prosecutors may argue
that an officer's actions were reckless.
Federal prosecutors face the same problems as local prosecutors
in convincing jurors to convict. Drew Days, Assistant U.S. Attor-
ney General for Civil Rights between 1977 and 1980, found that
the victims of police brutality are often the marginalized members
of the community.
47. See United States v. Shafer, 384 F. Supp. 496, 503 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (Even the
... reckless use of excessive force, without more, does not satisfy the requirements of
[18 U.S.C.] § 242 . . . .There must exist an intention to 'punish or to prevent the
exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights ....').
48. As compared to § 241, most federal prosecutions are brought under § 242.
Section 241 provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate
any person . . .in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured to him by the Constitution ... or because of his having so exercised
the same; ... they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both; and if death results ... they shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced
to death.
18 U.S.C. § 241.
Section 242 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever, under the color of law ... willfully subjects any person ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by
the Constitution or laws of the United States ... shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if bodily injury
results ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and if death results ...shall be fined under this title, or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to
death.
Id. § 242.
49. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945).
50. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761 (1966).
51. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 761; Screws, 325 U.S. at 101.
2003] FAILURE TO CURB POLICE BRUTALITY 647
We talk about caste systems [in other countries], but we have
one in the United States. Police, as an institution, pick their vic-
tims very carefully. They pick racial minorities, they pick the
poor, they pick the homeless, they pick homosexuals, they pick
people who in their estimation are strangely dressed. They pick
those who do not make very persuasive witnesses. So what you
have is a nice, neat, well-spoken cop who says "I was doing my
duty," and a victim who is often inarticulate, often with a crimi-
nal record, and often without anybody to provide character
support.52
It should not come as a surprise then that the Criminal Section
of the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of
Justice reports a higher success rate for all other prosecutions than
for official misconduct cases.53 For example, the Criminal Section's
overall success rate compared to its rate of success in law enforce-
ment cases for the years 1990 to 1994 were 94.4 percent to 77.8
percent (1990), 89.3 percent to 80.6 percent (1991), 85 percent to
62.2 percent (1992), 73.6 percent to 58.7 percent (1993), and 90.2
percent to 78.7 percent (1994). 54
Even when federal prosecutors are able to obtain convictions, it
has not effectively changed police practices. John Dunne, U.S. As-
sistant Attorney General for Civil Rights between 1990 and 1993,
observed that "few isolated successful prosecutions have had the
trickle-down effect" that one might expect.55 For example, when
the Civil Rights Division obtained convictions against members of
the Philadelphia homicide squad in 1970s, the chief of police re-
fused to suspend the convicted officers and stated that they were
innocent until proven guilty by the United States Supreme Court.56
As a result, the Department of Justice sued the mayor, police com-
missioner, and police administrators of Philadelphia in a civil suit,
alleging a pattern of practice that deliberately encouraged police
52. ALEXIS AGATHOCLEOUS & HEATHER WARD, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROSE-
CUTING POLICE MISCONDUCT: REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS
DIVISION 8 (1998) (quoting Drew Days, Former Assistant United States Attorney
General for Civil Rights), available at http://www.vera.org/publication-pdf/miscon-
duct.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
53. Police brutality cases are classified under Official Misconduct.
54. Freeman, supra note 3, at 723 n.163 (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, Summary of
Criminal Section Activities (1985-94) (unpublished)). Note that these statistics can-
not readily be compared with the statistics provided by William Burmeister, because
they include convictions by guilty pleas, thereby raising the average.
55. AGATHOCLEOUS & WARD, supra note 52, at 9.
56. Id.
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abuse.57 The police department, however, successfully challenged
the legality of the lawsuit in United States v. Philadelphia.58
C. Uncooperative Police Witnesses Pose an
Obstacle for Prosecutors
The under-prosecution of police officers may be due in large part
to the conflict of having police officers supervise and investigate
themselves. Although police officers report approximately fifty
percent of the brutality cases investigated by the Manhattan Offi-
cial-Corruption Unit, police officers are often reluctant to testify
against each other.5 9 One Manhattan prosecutor stated, "It's never
easy to deal with the police department. They give you what they
want to give you."6 Justice Lawrence Stephens, head of the Offi-
cial-Corruption Unit of New York County's District Attorney's Of-
fice from 1990 to 1992, believes that "ninety percent of officers will
lie to cover their colleagues."61 Officers who cooperate risk aliena-
tion and often become outcasts within the department. As an ex-
ample, Stephens referred to a police officer that testified for his
unit approximately ten years ago and still receives dead rats in his
locker as a result of his cooperation.6 2 Unfortunately such behav-
ior encourages the "blue wall of silence," thereby preventing thor-
ough investigations.63 Officers guilty of using excessive force are
fully confident that fellow officers will either remain silent, or ver-
ify their cover story.64 After the beating of Rodney King, the of-
57. United States v. City of Philadelphia, 482 F. Supp. 1248, 1.252 (1979).
58. 644 F.2d 187, 206 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the federal government did not
have the authority to sue a local police department in order to correct its underlying
practices).
59. Interview with William Burmeister, supra note 36. Approximately fifty per-
cent of the cases that the Official-Corruption Unit reviews come from defense law-
yers. Id.
60. Daniel Wise, Brutality Cases are Tough to Prosecute, N.Y. TIMES, May 29,
1992, at Al.
61. Interview with Lawrence Stephens, supra note 38.
62. Id.
63. For example, in 1983, New York City transit police officers arrested Michael
Stewart for defacing a subway. Thirty minutes after the arrest, Stewart arrived at
Bellevue Hospital comatose. He died thirteen days later. None of the police officers
who came in contact with Michael Stewart spoke about what they saw, although sev-
eral witnesses saw police officers beating Stewart. Isabel Wilkerson, Jury Acquits All
Transit Officers In 1983 Death of Michael Stewart, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1985, at Al.
64. On May 3, 1991, George Holliday secretly videotaped four Los Angeles police
officers as they surrounded African-American motorist Rodney King after a car
chase. Holliday videotaped the police officers beating Rodney King. More than a
dozen officers stood by and watched the beating take place. David Nicholson, We the
Jury: A Split-Screen View of the King Trial, WASH. POST, May 3, 1992, at C3.
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ficers were so confident of their immunity from prosecution that
they bragged about the beating on the official police computer
system.65
When asked whether citizens should blame rogue cops or a de-
partment that permits misbehavior to occur, Burmeister responded
that both were culpable.66 He stated that even "bad apples" are
unlikely to break the law if they are closely supervised.67 "It is the
combination of bad officers and bad supervision that leads to po-
lice abuse."68 Unfortunately, supervision is often inadequate, and
in many police departments, it is quite common to find officers
who have not been disciplined despite a history of complaints. The
Christopher Commission, formed in the aftermath of the Rodney
King beating, identified forty-four officers with six or more com-
plaints of excessive force.69 Since that finding in 1991, nine of the
forty-four officers have been promoted, while only three have been
fired.7 0 The absence of meaningful discipline and the failure to
take citizen complaints seriously creates a culture that tolerates po-
lice abuse. The code of silence simply reinforces it.
65. The initial report of the beating came at 12:56 a.m., when Sergeant Koon's unit
reported to the Watch Commander's desk at Foothill Station:
"You just had a big time use of force ... tased and beat the suspect of CHP
pursuit, Big Time."
The station responded at 12:57 a.m.:
"Oh well...I'm sure the lizard didn't deserve it. . .
In response to a request from the scene for assistance for a "victim of a beating," the
LAPD dispatcher called the Los Angeles Fire Department for a rescue ambulance:
P.D.: .. .Foothill & Osborne. In the valley dude (Fire Department dis-
patcher laughs) and like he got beat up.
F.D.: (laugh) wait (laugh).
P.D.: We are on scene.
F.D.: Hold, hold on, give me the address again.
P.D.: Foothill & Osborne, he pissed us off, so I guess he needs an ambu-
lance now.
F.D.: Oh, Osborne, Little attitude adjustment?
P.D.: Yeah, we had to chase him.
F.D.: OH!
P.D.: CHP and us. I think that kind of irritated us a little.
F.D.: Why would you want to do that for?
P.D.: (laughter) should know better than run, they are going to pay a price
when they do that.
F.D.: What type of incident would you say this is?
P.D.: It's a ... it's a ... battery, he got beat up.
CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION, supra note 23, at 14-15.
66. Interview with William Burmeister, supra note 36.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Mark Curriden, When Good Cops Go Bad, 82 A.B.A. J. 62, 65 (1996).
70. Id.
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In the case of Abner Louima, who was tortured in the bathroom
of a New York City police precinct, investigators found only two
police officers willing to provide valuable information.7 1 They
learned virtually nothing from scores of other officers who were
granted limited immunity from prosecution.72 A senior investiga-
tor complained that officers would respond to questioning with "I
don't know," or "I wasn't there. ' 73 Furthermore, the Internal Af-
fairs Bureau mishandled the case by not reporting a tip they re-
ceived on the night of the beating. 74 As a result, investigators did
not arrive at the precinct until thirty-six hours after the incident.75
The delay provided the officers with an opportunity to destroy evi-
dence (the wooden stick allegedly used to sodomize Louima was
not found) and develop cover stories.76 The loss of evidence and
the code of silence unquestionably hindered the investigation. The
horrendous circumstances of the Louima case, combined with the
fact that officers abused him inside a police precinct, suggest that
officers have come to expect abuse to be tolerated. Zachary
Carter, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,
stated that "[t]he boldness of the action suggests a mind-set that
they could possibly get away with this extraordinary heinous of-
fense," and fears that "there might be some reason for them to
believe [that] .. .
D. Federal Prosecutors Will Also Encounter Police Resistance
Shifting responsibility to the U.S. Attorney's office for the prose-
cution of police brutality, however, may not result in more convic-
tions. FBI agents will encounter the same blue wall of silence that
investigators from the district attorney's office face. Federal
agents, as in the Louima case, would similarly suffer from delays
caused by the police department's internal affairs bureau. Unfor-
tunately, police officers are often the only witnesses who can sub-
stantiate a claim of police brutality. Thus, their unwillingness to
cooperate is often much more significant than which prosecutor,
state or federal, handles the case.
71. Barry, supra note 46, at Al.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. John Kifner, Police Say Tip Received Early in Torture Case was Mishandled,
N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 23, 1997, at 25.
75. Barry, supra note 46, at Al.
76. Id.
77. Dan Barry, 2 More Officers Held in Attack on Haitian Man, N.Y. TiMES, Aug.
19, 1997, at Al.
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III. FACTORS FAVORING FEDERAL PROSECUTION
OF POLICE BRUTALITY
Many scholars claim that federal prosecutors should have exclu-
sive responsibility for police brutality cases because there is an in-
herent conflict of interest when local prosecutors handle such
cases.7 8 Local prosecutors work closely with police officers and
need to maintain a good working relationship with them. Assistant
district attorneys rely upon officers to act as their eyes and ears on
the streets, and they may fear that those same officers will become
uncooperative after they choose to prosecute one of them. Cer-
tainly this problem will exist if the prosecutor is investigating an
officer who is a witness for her on another case. Thus, it is clear
that there must be some level of separation between assistant dis-
trict attorneys who prosecute police officers, and those who rely
upon the same officers as witnesses. As a result, district attorney's
offices generally assign these cases to a special unit. In Manhattan,
the Official Coruption Unit is responsible for these cases,79 while in
Los Angeles it is the Special Investigations Division.80
A. State Prosecutors May Decline to Prosecute
Unfortunately, local prosecutors often "fall back on their discre-
tion to decline" rather than pursue a victim's complaint. 81 From
1980 to 1991, the Los Angeles District Attorney's Office only pros-
ecuted forty-one officers out of 319 cases referred to them, a mere
thirteen percent.82 Currently, the Manhattan District Attorney's
Official-Corruption Unit only presents three or four cases of police
brutality to a grand jury each year.83 Prosecutors, who tolerate po-
78. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 3, at 719; Sa'id Wekili & Hyacinth E. Leus, Po-
lice Brutality: Problems of Excessive Force Litigation, 25 PAC. L.J. 171, 174 (1994);
Yale, supra note 9, at 1846-47.
79. The Official Corruption Unit was formed in 1991 after Governor Mario
Cuomo disbanded the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which had handled official
misconduct cases. Jerome H. Skolnick, Code Blue: Prosecuting Police Brutality Re-
quires Penetrating the Blue Wall of Science, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27-Apr. 10, 2000, at
49; see Patricia Hurtado, Alleged Police Beating Investigated, NEWSDAY, Sept. 23,
1997, at A08; Paul Moses, Knapp Words Echoing 20 Years Later, NEWSDAY, June 19,
1992, at 4.
80. Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions:
The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41 UCLA L. REV. 509, 559 (1994).
81. Freeman, supra note 3, at 719.
82. David Freed, Police Brutality Claims Are Rarely Prosecuted, L.A. TIMES, July
7, 1991, at Al. Note that these statistics are inconsistent with the Kolts Report, that
reported that there were a greater number of referrals. See KOLTS REPORT, supra
note 12, at 99-137.
83. Interview with William Burmeister, supra note 36.
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lice perjury in order to establish a good working relationship with
the police, are likely to overlook the use of excessive force for the
same reason. 84 The tolerance of police perjury or excessive force
sends a message that the legal rules do not apply when the defen-
dant/victim is "guilty." Stephens found great resistance within his
office to prosecuting officers for perjury.85 His unit investigated
and determined that a team of narcotics police officers within the
Thirty-Fourth Precinct lied about observing individuals buying
drugs, because the dealers would frustrate them by dealing inside a
building where their deals could not be seen by the police.86 De-
spite these findings, his colleagues within the District Attorney's
Office argued that the perjury committed by the officers should be
tolerated because it produced the right result-arrests of drug
dealers.87 After becoming the head of the unit, he felt that he went
from "wearing the white hat in the courtroom, to wearing the
black."88 If local prosecutors are pressured into turning a blind eye
to police perjury, an atmosphere is created in which officers may
feel that they have carte blanche to use excessive force.
After leading the Anti-Corruption Unit for two years, Stephens
believed that local prosecutors were unable to resolve this conflict
of interest, even with the creation of a separate unit within the Dis-
trict Attorney's Office.89 He stated that Governor Mario Cuomo's
decision to disband the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which
handled official misconduct cases and was unaffiliated with the
District Attorney's Office, was a grave mistake.90 Other prosecu-
tors have found it difficult to recruit assistants for the Official-Cor-
ruption Unit because they feared that, "over the long term," being
identified with a unit the cops did not like would compromise their
careers.
91
Prosecuting police officers will inevitably affect the public's im-
age of police. Jurors and judges may become more skeptical of
police testimony after a high-profile prosecution of a police officer.
In the wake of the Rodney King beating, many police chiefs found
that the community's perception of police officers suddenly
84. See Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It,
67 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1037, 1047 (1996).
85. Interview with Lawrence Stephens, supra note 38.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Wise, supra note 60, at Al.
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changed from positive to negative. Local prosecutors may justify
dismissing complaints of police brutality because such cases draw
the media's attention to police officers who lie and violate the
law-a significant problem given that local prosecutors routinely
rely upon officers as witnesses.
B. Federal Authorities May Rely on Pattern
of Practice Lawsuits
As a result of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, federal authorities now have the ability to change how
local police departments operate. 92 The law empowers the Depart-
ment of Justice to force police departments to implement internal
review systems or to enjoin them from allowing officers to use
deadly chokeholds. 93 Since passage of the law, the Civil Rights Di-
vision of the Department of Justice has begun investigating several
departments across the country, including Los Angeles, New Orle-
ans, and Washington, D.C.9 4 Furthermore, it has negotiated con-
sent decrees in Steubenville, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.95
The Civil Rights Division is currently discussing a consent decree
with the New Jersey State Police, a statewide law enforcement
agency accused of racial profiling. 96 In addition, the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office in the Eastern District of New York is currently inves-
tigating the New York City Police Department's disciplinary
system in response to the Abner Louima incident. 97 Theoretically,
92. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141
(1994). Section 14141(a) reads in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any agent thereof, or
any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pat-
tern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers ... that deprives
persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Con-
stitution or laws of the United States.
Id. § 14141(a). Section 14141(b) reads in pertinent part: "Whenever the Attorney
General has reasonable cause to believe a violation of paragraph (1) [subsection (a)
of this section] has occurred, the Attorney General ... may in a civil action obtain
appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice." Id.
§ 14141(b).
93. See Marshall Miller, Note, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149,
189-94 (1998) (discussing equitable relief under § 14141).
94. Benjamin Weiser, The Diallo Shooting: Other Investigations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 1999, § 1, at 46.
95. Id.
96. Jerry Gray, New Jersey Plans to Forestall Suit on Race Profiling, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 30, 1999, at Al.
97. Weiser, supra note 94, § 1, at 46. Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani was unenthu-
siastic about the federal investigation. He said, "I thought the era of Federal
micromanaging is over, and of the Federal Government trying to come in and pre-
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the power to change police practices complements the federal pros-
ecutor's ability to pursue individual civil rights violations.
Thus, the Justice Department may be better suited to handle po-
lice brutality because it has both the power to prosecute individual
officers and to force a police department to change its pattern of
practice. Although a local prosecutor may argue that an individual
officer unreasonably used a chokehold, only the federal prosecutor
can enjoin the department from using that particular chokehold.
Just the mere threat of a federal lawsuit may provide the needed
push for reform within a law enforcement agency. For example,
the state troopers of New Jersey have agreed to change some of
their practices in order to avoid a federal lawsuit. 98 These mea-
sures include informing the dispatcher of the exact reason for a
stop before the officer leaves the car, refocusing drug enforcement
by targeting "impact cases" rather than pursuing passenger vehi-
cles, and publishing reports on the number of minorities and non-
minorities stopped.99
The statutory tools available to federal prosecutors suggest that
they should have primary responsibility for investigating police
brutality. If federal prosecutors were to assume responsibility for
handling individual cases of brutality, they would be in a better
position to discern patterns of abuse that could support civil law-
suits. Although each state has the ability to pass laws similar to the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, none have done
so to this point. Furthermore, state legislatures would more likely
grant such power to the state attorney general than to the district
attorneys, thereby separating the tools available to a single federal
prosecutor.
C. Sentencing Favors Federal Prosecution
Although sentencing guidelines provide for stiffer penalties
under federal laws, officers, across the jurisdictions, routinely re-
ceive fairly light punishment. For example, three of the four of-
ficers from Prince George County in Maryland were convicted of
beating a burglar into unconsciousness after subduing and hand-
tending that it can straighten out problems that local governments cannot straighten
out." Id.
98. Gray, supra note 96, at B13.
99. Id. Note that the number of searches conducted by the New Jersey State
Troopers dropped from 440 in 1999, to 281 in 2000 when the federal authorities
threatened to sue. Nevertheless, a majority of the 281 drivers that were stopped were
minorities, including 123 African-American and seventy Latinos. Iver Peterson,
Turnpike Data Show Decline in Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at B1.
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cuffing him, yet received only sixty days in jail.100 In other similar
cases, officers received only fines or community service. 10 ' Free-
man argues that these trivial sentences "dilute the message that the
police are not above the law.' 10 2
Overall, the federal sentencing guidelines have increased the
time served by convicted officers.103 For example, the federal court
sentenced Officer Justin Volpe to thirty years for sodomizing Ab-
ner Louima, while his fellow officer, Charles Schwarz, was found
guilty of perjury and agreed to serve five years, considerably more
time than either would have received in state court.104 In the Rod-
ney King beating, however, the Supreme Court held that an of-
ficer's status as a law enforcement official might entitle him to a
sentencing departure because of his vulnerability in prison. 10 5 Fur-
thermore, the Court held that officers may receive a downward de-
parture in sentencing if the victim's conduct provoked the use of
force, for example, Rodney King's attempt to flee.'0 6 Freeman ar-
gues that these departures harm the principles behind the law by
giving special considerations to law enforcement officials. 10 7 De-
spite these downward departures, officers guilty of police brutality
will receive longer sentences if prosecuted by federal rather than
local prosecutors.
IV. FACTORS FAVORING LOCAL PROSECUTION
OF POLICE BRUTALITY
This Section will argue that the primary responsibility for prose-
cuting police brutality should be placed in the hands of local prose-
cutors, despite the advantages detailed above of having federal
prosecutors handle such cases. First, the press and the public will
be more successful in holding elected district attorneys instead of
100. Freeman, supra note 3, at 680-81 (citing Jon Jeter, 3 P.G. Officers Sentenced to
Jail for Beating Suspect; Judge's Decision Unprecedented in County, WASH. POST, June
14, 1995, at B1).
101. Id. at 679.
102. Id. at 682.
103. Id. at 734. The average prison sentence for the twenty-five offenders who
were sentenced to prison between September 30, 1985 and September 30, 1987, was
18.7 months. After the guidelines, the average sentence for the seventy-seven offend-
ers who went to prison was 28.2 months. Id.
104. Joseph P. Fried, Volpe Sentenced to a 30-Year Term in Louima Torture, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at B3; Glaberson, Case Closed, Not Resolved, supra note 11, at
Al. Under state law, Volpe would have served a minimum of five years and a maxi-
mum of twenty-five. Id.
105. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
106. Id.
107. Freeman, supra note 3, at 727.
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Congressional Representatives accountable for failing to prosecute
abusive police officers. Second, Congress has not provided the De-
partment of Justice with sufficient staffing to prosecute all the cases
of police brutality. Furthermore, federal prosecutors would not be
able to obtain convictions in cases where the officer's actions were
simply reckless rather than intentional. Finally, given the resources
available to federal prosecutors, they are more likely to influence
police practice by focusing upon their unique power to sue local
police departments.
A. Local Prosecutors May Be Held Accountable
Through Elections
Accountability suggests that the local prosecutor should have the
dominant role in prosecuting police violence. Citizens elect the
district attorney, whereas the President appoints the Attorney
General and the U.S. Attorneys. Thus, the district attorney is be-
holden to the people of her county to ensure that she upholds the
law in all cases, including those involving the police. For a district
attorney to suggest that a federal prosecutor should handle a par-
ticular case is to suggest that her office is incapable of fulfilling its
mission. In the next election, a challenger could highlight this issue
in her campaign. Handing a case to the federal prosecutor also
sends a mixed message to victims, witnesses, and jurors by sug-
gesting that the district attorney cannot untangle herself from the
police and serve as a minister of justice. Lastly, it seems natural to
rely upon the district attorney to handle crimes that occur in her
jurisdiction, rather than sending them to a federal prosecutor who
may be located miles away.
District attorneys have not always been held accountable for fail-
ing to prosecute police brutality. The "public's fear of crime has
given the police carte blanche to 'control the streets and enforce
the status quo." 0 8 Referring to drug-interdiction as the "War on
Drugs" sends a message to the police that jurors, local prosecutors,
and judges will tolerate whatever needs to be done in order to
win.1°9 Unfortunately, there may be a large section of the popula-tion willing to tolerate these abuses in order to wage a successful
108. Darlene Ricker, Does Society Condone Police Brutality in Exchange for Get-
ting Criminals Off the Streets?, 77 A.B.A. J. 45, 45 (1991) (quoting David Rudovsky,
The Criminal Justice System and the Police, in THE POLITICS OF LAW (1982)).
109. Id.
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war on crime, drugs, and gangs in urban America. 110 Community
pressure, however, could also serve to force police departments to
initiate reforms, while pressing the district attorneys to spend more
resources on prosecuting police officers. In the aftermath of the
Amadou Diallo shooting, protestors in New York City brought
about reforms within the police department."1 Meanwhile, the
Bronx County District Attorney's Office spent considerable re-
sources trying to obtain convictions against the four officers who
shot Amadou Diallo.1 2
Federal prosecutors are less likely than their local counterparts
to serve as sources of accountability for police brutality. In 1991,
United States Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.) held hearings
on the roles of the FBI and the Department of Justice in investigat-
ing police brutality.1 3 In particular, Edwards sought an explana-
tion for why the office pursued only a small number of indictments
given the large volume of complaints received." 4 Edwards was un-
satisfied with the explanations that the FBI and the Department of
Justice provided.'15 During those hearings, Assistant Attorney
General John Dunne testified that "[w]e are not the front-line
troops in combating instances of police abuse. That role properly
lies with the internal affairs bureaus of law enforcement agencies
and with state and local prosecutors. The federal enforcement pro-
gram is more like a back-stop to these other resources."' 16
110. See, e.g., JEROME SKOLNICK & JAMES FYFE, ABOVE THE LAW: POLICE AND
THE EXCESSIVE USE OF FORCE 12-15 (1993); Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1462-73
(claiming that the city of Los Angeles supported the military style of policing offered
by Chief Daryl Gates and Sheriff Sherman Block, despite the complaints of abuse).
But in the election for District Attorney of Los Angeles County, one contender at-
tacked District Attorney Ira Reiner for failing to prosecute police officers engaged in
brutality. Sheryl Stolberg, First Challenger in D.A.'s Race Blasts Reiner as 'Pretender,'
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1991, at B3.
111. Drop the '48-Hour Rule', N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1998, at A28. The Giuliani ad-
ministration and the police sergeants' union agreed in principle to discard a rule al-
lowing New York City Police Officers involved in shootings to wait two days before
answering investigators' questions. Id.; see Michael Cooper, Safir Defends Frisking
Policy Before a Panel of Skeptics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at B4 (discussing Police
Commissioner Howard Safir's transfer of fifty minority police officers to the Street
Crime Unit).
112. See Amy Waldman, Preparing for a Trial on Wheels; Headaches Abound as
Diallo Case Moves to Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000, at B1.
113. Ricker, supra note 108, at 48.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1492 (citing Police Brutality Hearings, supra note 22
(statements of John Dunne)).
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Paul Hoffman has criticized the "back-stop" explanation as an
excuse for federal inaction.' 17 He pointed out that, in the early
1990s, the first Bush Administration enlarged the federal law en-
forcement presence on the streets, but made no attempt to per-
suade Congress that the Department of Justice should have the
authority to bring civil lawsuits against police departments.' 1 8
A national and standardized system of receiving and recording
complaints against police officers would draw attention to the issue
of police abuse and increase accountability.' 19 Currently, the At-
torney General's office is required to collect data about the exces-
sive use of force from local police departments and to publish an
annual summary. 2 ' Rob Yale, however, recommends creating a
standardized system to receive and record complaints at an agency
located away from the local police station. 2 ' Assigning an inde-
pendent agency to handle complaints may encourage victims dis-
trustful of the police to come forward and report abuses when they
might not otherwise do so. The independent agency would then
forward the complaints to the local law enforcement agency or to
the local U.S. Attorney's office. 2 In addition, the agency would
issue statistical reports, that could include data such as the number
of complaints filed against each law enforcement organization,
each organization's per capita complaint ratio, and, for those law
enforcement agencies that chose to respond, the results of each
complaint. 123 The creation of an independent agency would pre-
vent police departments from sanitizing their records and would
force prosecutors to acknowledge the existence of police violence.
117. Id. at 1490-93.
118. Id. at 1490.
119. Yale, supra note 9, at 1854-58.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 14142 (1995).
Section 14142 reads:
(a) Attorney General to collect
The Attorney General shall, through appropriate means, acquire data about
the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers.
(b) Limitations on the use of data
Data acquired under this section shall be used only for research or statistical
purposes and may not contain any information that may reveal the identity
of the victim or any law enforcement officer.
(c) Annual Summary
The Attorney General shall publish an annual summary of the data acquired
under this section.
Id.
121. Yale, supra note 9, at 1855.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Ultimately, the press may have to be relied upon to force local
and federal prosecutors to fulfill their obligation to prosecute po-
lice brutality. 124 The press coverage of the Rodney King incident
not only led to a federal conviction, but also encouraged Congress
to conduct hearings on police brutality and to grant federal prose-
cutors the power to sue police departments. The protests in New
York City drew attention to the issues of police abuse and may
have encouraged local and federal officials to examine the prac-
tices of the New York City Police Department.125
B. Obtaining Resources to Prosecute Police Abuse
Is a Matter of Political Will
Neither local nor federal prosecutors in metropolitan areas have
an advantage in terms of resources. Both, however, could develop
the expertise necessary to prosecute police officers by creating a
separate section to handle official corruption and abuse. Mary Jo
White, former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, decided not to create such a specialized section in her office
because she felt that she did not have sufficient resources to assign
attorneys to cases involving only police misconduct.1 26 Unfortu-
nately, both state and federal prosecutors will always suffer from
financial constraints. Nevertheless, prosecutors must be willing to
shift resources if they truly believe that patterns of police abuse
pose a civil rights emergency.
While the federal law enforcement budget has grown in the past
decades, the size of the staff at the Civil Rights Division has re-
mained largely static, thereby limiting the number of indictments
and convictions.12 7 Currently the Justice Department employs
9,168 attorneys, but the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Divi-
124. The press was referred to by the Founding Fathers as the "fourth branch of
government." See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINCS L.J. 63t, 654 (1975).
125. In both the Louima beating and Diallo shooting, federal authorities quickly
began an investigation. See John Kifner, Officer Assigned to Haiti Are to Join the 70th
Precinct, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1997, at B3; Paul Zielbauer, F.B.L Examines Site in
Bronx Where Police Fatally Shot Unarmed Man, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at B5. In
the aftermath, the New York Attorney General's office issued a report on the "stop
and frisks" conducted by New York City's Police Department. OFFICE OF N.Y.
STATE ATTORNEY GEN. ELIOT SPITZER, THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPART-
MENT'S "STOP AND FRISK" PRACTICES (1999).
126. Discussion with Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of
New York, at New York University School of Law, Seminar on Prosecution (Apr. 6,
1999).
127. Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1492-93.
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sion employs only about twenty to thirty full-time attorneys.128
This staffing shortage will limit the Department of Justice's ability
to implement the Violent Crime Control and Law-Enforcement
Act. Given these limited resources, it is not surprising that Ste-
phen J. Pollak, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights from
1968-1969, believes that the division's strategy should be to wait
and intervene only when the local authorities have failed to act. 129
"The whole job is to get local authorities and district attorneys to
bring these departments in line and bring prosecutions.' 30 This
approach may work if local and state officials respond to public
pressure. For example, in the aftermath of the Diallo shooting,
Governor John G. Rowland of Connecticut responded to a police
shooting of an African-American youth by appointing an indepen-
dent prosecutor and removing control of the investigation from the
Hartford police.13'
The "back-stop" approach relies upon the political will of local
prosecutors to allocate resources to prosecute police violence when
the victim may be a convicted felon and the conviction will be diffi-
cult to obtain. In Manhattan, the Official Corruption Unit has
seven assistant district attorneys, six investigators, and a support
staff comprised of several paralegals and a receptionist.'32 This is
negligible when one considers that over six hundred attorneys
work for the New York County District Attorney's Office. Never-
theless, Burmeister believed that his staffing was sufficient and
claims that his unit had more resources available to it than similar
units in other counties. 133 At any given time, an Assistant District
Attorney in the Official Corruption Unit is actively investigating
fifteen to twenty-five cases of official misconduct, including cases
involving police officers. 134 This unit has generally been successful
in obtaining convictions during its twelve years of existence, al-
though there is no indication that it has successfully curbed police
violence in New York City. 135
128. AGATHOCLEOUS & WARD, supra note 52, at 4.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id.
131. Mike Allen, After Diallo, Newfound Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, at
A43.
132. Interview with William Burmeister, supra note 36; see Skolnick, supra note 79,
at 49.
133. Interview with William Burmeister, supra note 36.
134. Id.
135. Skolnick, supra note 79, at 49.
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Ultimately, the question of whether a prosecutor has the re-
sources to prosecute police brutality turns on whether the chief
prosecutor is willing to prioritize this issue. The local prosecutor is
more likely than the federal prosecutor to do so because she will
have to run for re-election. Although U.S. Attorneys may call
upon the Department of Justice for assistance, the Department of
Justice does not have the staffing to effectively cover the entire
nation.
CONCLUSION
In the Louima case, U.S. Attorney Zachary Carter and Brooklyn
District Attorney Charles Hynes decided that the federal prosecu-
tors were in the best position to handle the case. 36 They ultimately
obtained convictions. The federal prosecutors exclusive ability to
sue for unlawful pattern-or-practice, however, suggests that they
should devote their limited resources to civil actions, leaving crimi-
nal prosecutions to the local prosecutors. Former Assistant U.S.
Attorney General Drew Days disagrees:
If somebody is dead or seriously wounded as a result of police
brutality, something has to be done about it. From the stand-
point of the federal government, there is no higher responsibil-
ity. That really is at the heart of constitutional government. If
the federal government is not going to protect people's rights
against this type of abuse, then what does federal government
exist to do? 1 3 7
To answer Days' loaded question, the federal government exists
to protect and promote federal norms. That role, however, does
not require federal prosecutors to take individual cases away from
local prosecutors who are willing to file charges. Federal prosecu-
tors are more likely to curb police violence and fulfill their role in
protecting our constitutional rights by focusing upon civil actions.
If Congress passed national legislation requiring local prosecu-
tors to forward complaints to federal authorities, or created an
agency to receive such complaints, federal prosecutors would be
able to determine which police departments failed to discipline
their own. Pattern-of-practice lawsuits are more likely to curb po-
lice violence because they target the culture that emboldens of-
ficers to believe that they can abuse their power. Furthermore,
136. Fried, supra note 10, at B4. Ultimately, Zachary Carter and Alan Vinegrad,
his successor, were responsible for obtaining convictions against two police officers,
Justin Volpe and Charles Schwarz. Fried, supra note 104, at Al.
137. AGATHOCLEOUS & WARD, supra note 52, at 18.
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prosecution of individual officers has failed to effectively deter
other officers from using excessive force. 138 Despite the federal
conviction of the police officers involved in the Rodney King beat-
ing, the Los Angeles police department is again plagued with nu-
merous accounts of police violence and corruption.139 Less than a
decade after the Rodney King beating, officers in the Rampart Di-
vision admitted to shooting a gang member and framing him by
planting a gun.' 40 Corruption was so widespread within the Ram-
part Division that nine convictions were reversed and potentially
hundreds of cases were tainted. 141 One must wonder whether we
would have read the same headlines if the federal authorities
sought to change the police department through civil lawsuits,
rather than the prosecution of individual officers.
Although federal prosecutors should continue to investigate
cases of police brutality when it results in death or serious injury,
they should give local prosecutors the opportunity to pursue these
cases. They would then be able to fulfill their "back-stop" role and
protect our rights if the local prosecutor declined to file charges.
Additionally, the federal authorities do not have the resources to
pursue every excessive force case. Thus, it is appropriate that the
primary responsibility for prosecuting police violence belongs to
the district attorneys, who can be held accountable by the public
and the press to ensure that their resources are spent prosecuting
police violence.
138. See Todd S. Purdum, Los Angeles Police Scandal May Soil Hundreds of Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999, at A16.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
